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Abstract
Recently, Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2008) proposed that earnings quality influence firms’
disclosure decisions. We examine whether Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosure
is related to earnings management and if the relationship is mitigated by political cost
considerations or by the firm’s ethical predisposition. We argue that the relationship between
CSR reporting and earnings management is context-specific and we consider one particular
context, the political environment. We test our hypotheses by regressing earnings
management on CSR disclosure while controlling for other factors that may affect the level of
earnings management. We find a significant relationship between CSR reporting and earnings
management, and more specifically, we find evidence of a negative (complementary)
relationship in the oil and gas industry while we find evidence of a positive (substitutive)
relationship in the food industry. The evidence supports the view that the relationship
between CSR reporting and earnings management is affected by the political environment
and not by ethical considerations.
Key Words: Corporate social responsibility (CSR), earnings management, relationship
between CSR and earnings management.
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Introduction
Issues such as global warming, emission trading schemes and carbon taxes have pushed
environmental issues into the mainstream. Conditions of employment and the treatment of
employees by multinationals in developing and other countries have also focussed attention on
social issues. Increasing concern about the sustainability of the world’s resources has contributed to
the rising importance of corporate social responsibility (CSR). With labels such as corporate
citizenship, the triple bottom line, and more recently sustainability, the concept of CSR extends the
accountability of firms beyond financial accountability to their shareholders and to other
stakeholders.
However, maximising financial performance and firm value remain key objectives for all
publicly traded companies. In fact, given that earnings are an important indicator of financial
performance, managers can find themselves under pressure to use the flexibility afforded under
generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP) to manage earnings to meet certain expectations or
targets.3 For example, DeGeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) find that managers manage earnings
upward to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts (see also Ghosh & Olsen 2009).
In this study, we examine the relationship between CSR reporting and earnings
management. We consider two separate explanations. First, the ethics literature acknowledges that
firms can, and should be, ethically responsible. For example, Hoffman (1986, p. 234) suggests that
“although it may be tricky both conceptually and practically, corporations and other collectives can,
must in fact, stand up to the demands of moral responsibility, even though their actions are carried
out by individuals acting on their behalf”. Furthermore, according to Chun (2005), ethical
organisations will display integrity by being honest, sincere, socially-responsible, and trustworthy.
Firms may demonstrate ethical commitment through philanthropic contributions and through using
its resources and expertise to benefit society, e.g. reducing waste, employing minorities, and caring
for the environment (Hoffman 1986). Thus, under an ethical perspective, firms that are socially
responsible and make CSR disclosures would be less inclined to manage earnings (i.e., reporting
earnings honestly and sincerely).
Second, Francis et al. (2008) propose that earnings quality – which is the inverse of earnings
management – influences firms’ disclosure decisions. They use voluntary disclosures to test this
proposition, but their definition for voluntary disclosures excludes CSR disclosures. Francis et al.
(2008) propose that the relationship between earnings quality and voluntary disclosure could be
complementary or substitutive.4 We extend their proposition to CSR reporting in order to determine
if CSR disclosure decisions are associated with the extent of a firms’ earnings management. We
propose that whether the relationship is substitutive or complementary could be context-specific,
and we consider one particular context, the political environment. Specifically, the political cost
hypothesis predicts that firms that have greater visibility in the political arena – and, therefore, are
attractive targets for government-imposed wealth transfers (e.g. taxation, regulation) – have
incentives to make more voluntary disclosures in an effort to minimise political costs (e.g. Watts &
Zimmerman 1986). Thus, under a political cost perspective, the relationship between (voluntary)
CSR disclosures and earnings management would vary depending on the political environment of
the firm.
We test our hypotheses using data from two U.S. industries, the oil and gas industry and the
food industry. The oil and gas industry in the U.S. has received on-going political scrutiny since the
1973 Arab oil crisis. On the other hand, the food industry has received much less political attention.
Consistent with the accounting literature, we use the absolute value of discretionary accruals
estimated using the Jones (1991) model to measure earnings management.
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Our sample is based on U.S. firms that report using U.S. GAAP.
A complementary relationship would imply that firms with more voluntary disclosures have higher earnings quality,
i.e. the two concepts complement each other, while a substitutive relationship implies that firms with lower earnings
quality would make more voluntary disclosures, as substitute for the lower earnings quality.
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Our results are consistent with our hypotheses. We find a significant relationship between
CSR reporting and earnings management, and more specifically, we find evidence of a negative
(complementary) relationship in the oil and gas industry while we find evidence of a positive
(substitutive) relationship in the food industry. This evidence (i.e., the different relationships in the
two industries) supports the view that the relationship between CSR reporting and earnings
management is driven more by the political environment than by ethical considerations.
Investigating this relationship is important for a number of reasons. First, as already
indicated, CSR and CSR reporting are becoming more important issues in society and there is
evidence that CSR reporting is increasing among big firms around the world (KPMG 2008 – based
on the Global Fortune top 250 companies). Understanding the relationship between these
disclosures and earnings quality is therefore important. Second, our study extends the Francis et al.
(2008) study to a different voluntary disclosure and a different context. Finally, we combine
research from the areas of corporate social responsibility and earnings management. Although there
is a large quantity of research literature in each of these areas, there appears to be a gap in the
literature combining these areas.
The paper is structured as follows: The next part reviews the literature and then the
hypotheses are formulated based on theoretical expectations. This is followed by the research
design and a discussion of the results. The conclusions of the study follow.
Literature Review
Corporate Social Responsibility
CSR holds organisations accountable under three dimensions – their social and environmental
performance as well as the traditional financial perspective (Adams & Zutshi 2004). This concept is
wider than just meeting legal responsibility (Rose 2007) and incorporates the ideas of making
morally acceptable decisions (Branco & Rodrigues 2006) while engaging in business which is not
harmful to stakeholders as well as meeting the demands of these different parties (Bansal &
Kandola 2004).
Providing disclosures on CSR activities is a way for firms to communicate to their
stakeholders how they are responding to these issues. Over the years, there has been an increasing
trend in the number of companies publishing corporate social information. In 2008, 83% of the
Global Fortune top 250 companies published corporate responsibility information with 79%
publishing a separate report, compared with 52% in 2005, 45% in 2002 and 35% in 1999 (KPMG,
2008). Although some of these disclosures are mandatory, firms also engage increasingly in
discretionary (voluntary) disclosures in this area.
CSR disclosure affects the perceptions of stakeholders. Stakeholders perceive the
information disclosed by CSR reporting to be useful (Dierkes & Antal 1985; Gray, Kouhy & Lavers
1995). Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen and Hughes II (2004) and Clarkson, Richardson and Vasvari
(2008) find a significant positive correlation between environmental reporting and environmental
performance, suggesting that environmental disclosures reflect environmental performance, and
Gelb and Strawser (2001) find that good CSR performance and good disclosure are positively
related. These studies suggest that CSR reports published by firms reflect their true social actions,
or what is known as CSR performance.
Some of the earlier studies in the literature studying the relationship between CSR
performance and CSR disclosure were inconclusive or found weak relationships.5 Patten (2002)
suggested a number of reasons for this, mainly that the samples were too small and that the studies
did not control for extraneous variables that could influence the relationship. Patten (2002) found a
negative relationship using a bigger sample (131 firms) and controlling for firm size and industry.
The more recent studies in the area have taken Patten’s concerns into account, and Clarkson et al.
5

See Patten (2002) for a review of the early literature.
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(2008), Van Staden and Hooks (2007) and Al-Tuwariji et al. (2004) find significant positive
correlations between environmental performance and disclosure, while Cho and Patten (2007) still
find a negative correlation. So while earlier studies suggest that the relationship between CSR
performance and disclosure is weak or negative, the later studies, having taken into account Patten’s
(2002) suggestions, tend to find a positive relationship.
Earnings Management and CSR
Earnings management is described as management actions which reduce the quality of the financial
statements (Kinney Jnr, Palmrose & Scholz 2004). As Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001) explain,
earnings management occurs when the manager exercises discretion over the accounting numbers.
Further, managers will only engage in earnings management if they believe that users of accounting
information cannot completely adjust the accounting numbers to remove the effect of earnings
management. As earnings management leads to lower earnings quality, it reduces the predictive
ability of future earnings and cash flows (Lev 2003). To the extent that earnings are managed to
mislead investors, earnings management is generally considered to be unethical (Kaplan 2001).6
Earnings management is possible because GAAP identifies the bounds for appropriate
accounting rather than prescribing every accounting method and every accounting estimate that
must be used by the firm. Also, besides the use of compounding variables and estimates, there are
principles such as matching which give rise to arbitrary accounting items through accruals. As an
example, in accounting for a non-current asset, the firm will choose the method of depreciation as
well as the useful life of asset. These choices are reflected in the firm’s accruals which are the
difference between the firm’s net income and cash flows. Since GAAP requires that the firm must
depreciate this asset, depreciation can be decomposed into a normal component and abnormal
component.
We found no studies investigating the link between CSR disclosure and earnings
management. However, Francis et al. (2008) examine whether the association between voluntary
financial (i.e., non-CSR) disclosure and earnings quality is complementary or substitutive.7 They
used a self-constructed voluntary disclosure index and a sample of 677 US firms. They found
evidence of a significant complementary relationship between earnings quality and voluntary
financial (i.e., non-CSR) disclosure, e.g. firms with more voluntary disclosures have higher earnings
quality – or, alternatively, lower earnings management. Our study is similar in spirit to Francis et al.
(2008) except we focus on CSR disclosures and we examine whether the relationship between CSR
disclosure and earnings quality is context-specific. Specifically, we consider one particular context,
the political environment. We use two industries, the oil and gas and food industries, to study the
effect of the political environment.
Additionally, a few studies have examined the link between CSR performance and earnings
management. As Chih, Shen and Kang (2008) explain, earnings management could be negatively,
positively, or not related to CSR performance. If high CSR firms want to maintain financial
transparency, they should engage in less earnings management, implying a negative relationship.
On the other hand, if high CSR firms try to meet the demands of multiple stakeholders, financial
performance could suffer, leading these firms to manage reported earnings upwards to obscure the
weaker than expected results. They refer to this as the multiple objectives hypothesis. Finally, they
note that there could be no relationship between CSR performance and earnings management if
earnings management is driven by institutional factors unrelated to CSR. Chih et al. (2008) find that
three measures of earnings management – earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and avoidance
of earnings decreases – are higher among high CSR firms, supporting their multiple objectives
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For a general review of the earnings management literature, see Fields et al. (2001).
Earnings quality is the inverse of earnings management. Firms with good earnings quality will therefore have low
earnings management and vice versa.
7
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hypothesis.8 Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) finds that firms with a high level of CSR performance had
more discretionary accruals, also in line with the multiple objectives argument of Chih et al. (2008).
In our study, we focus on CSR disclosures rather than CSR performance because CSR
disclosures, like earnings, are easily observed. On the other hand, as prior studies suggest,
measuring CSR performance is problematic. That is, given that CSR performance is complex and
multi-faceted, reducing it to a single measure would result in an excessively noisy proxy at best, and
misleading results at worst.
Theoretical Perspectives and Hypotheses
Research explaining firms’ tendency to make CSR disclosures often rely on legitimacy theory (De
Villiers & Van Staden 2006; Deegan 2002; Dowling & Pfeffer 1975). Legitimacy theory is based
on the premise that firms should be operating within the norms and expectations of the society
within which they operate. Various strategies can be used to obtain legitimacy (Dowling & Pfeffer
1975; Lindblom 1993). These strategies vary from changing goals, methods and outputs to
changing perceptions about the firm’s goals, methods and outputs.
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) consider the actions taken by firms to avoid the adverse
political attention that high profits draw. According to the political cost hypothesis, large firms are
more likely to use accounting choices that reduce reported profits and/or make other disclosures to
reduce political costs. For example, these companies may choose to use accounting methods that
reduce reported income or undertake “social responsibility campaigns in the media” in order to
reduce the likelihood that they will be targeted by adverse political actions. This is done in order to
prevent wealth transfers away from the firm and is therefore in the interest of both management and
shareholders.
There is a substantial body of research that provides support for the political cost hypothesis.
For example, Cahan (1992) finds that U.S. firms reduce their discretionary accruals while they are
being investigated for antitrust violations. Hall (1993) and Hall and Stammerjohan (1997) provide
evidence that petroleum and gas firms reduce reported earnings to avoid political and litigation
costs. Key (1997) finds that firms that were most likely affected by proposed regulation of the cable
television industry had lower discretionary accruals, and similarly, Cahan, Chavis and Elmendorf
(1997) find chemical firms most affected by the chemical clean-up fund, the Superfund, had lower
discretionary accruals while that legislation was being debated in the U.S. Congress. While an
ethical perspective suggests that ethical firms will minimise earnings management, the political cost
argument offers another reason for lower accruals and earnings management.
We examine whether CSR disclosure is related to earnings management and if the
relationship is mitigated by political cost considerations or by the firm’s ethical predisposition.
Although Francis et al. (2008) find a significant complementary relationship between voluntary
disclosure and earnings quality (which implies an ethical stance, as firms with better earnings
quality make more disclosures), they did not explore whether this relationship is context specific,
i.e. that the relationship could be mitigated by the political environment in which the firm operates,
that is the political costs faced by the firm. We examine whether the relationship between earnings
management and CSR disclosure is driven more by political cost considerations than by the firm’s
ethical predisposition. If the latter dominates, we would expect a negative relationship between
CSR disclosure and earnings management, regardless of the political environment in which the firm
operates (i.e. the political costs faced by the firm). If political cost considerations dominate, we
would expect a negative (positive) relationship between CSR disclosure and earnings management
when political costs are high (low).9
8

Chih et al. (2008) do not use a measure of discretionary accruals, but focus on total accruals instead.
Our measure for earnings quality is earnings management, which is the inverse of earnings quality (i.e. higher earnings
management results in lower earnings quality and vice versa). Specifically, for an ethical predisposition we expect CSR
disclosure to be negatively related to earnings management (i.e. positively related to earnings quality). If political cost
considerations dominate we expect CSR disclosure to be positively related to earnings management (i.e. negatively
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Our study concentrates on two industries – the food industry and oil and gas refining
industry, rather than generalising across all industries. We choose the oil and gas industry since it is
arguably the most politically scrutinised industry in the U.S. Also, as mentioned above, Hall (1993)
and Hall and Stammerjohan (1997) find that the political cost hypothesis is supported in the oil and
gas industry. We choose the food industry as an industry that has historically had much lower
political visibility relative to the oil and gas industry.10
Of course, it should be reasonable to assume firms within the same industry can have
different levels of political costs and ethical behaviour. Our analyses identify statistical trends for
the industry, but that does not imply every firm in the industry behaves identically. Thus, we
examine the following joint hypotheses:
H1A CSR disclosure is negatively related to earnings management regardless of the level of
political costs (ethical perspective) (i.e., firms with less earnings management – or high
quality earnings – will be more likely to have CSR disclosure)
H1B CSR disclosure is negatively (positively) related to earnings management when political
costs are high (low) (political cost perspective).
Research Design
Sample Selection
The sample is composed of publicly listed firms in the US from the food and oil and gas industries.
We define the food industry as firms having four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
codes from 2000-2099. The food industry includes firms involved in meat packaging, dairy, bakery,
canned foods, and beverages. We define the oil and gas industry as firms having four-digit SIC
codes from 2900-2999. This includes oil and gas firms with significant petroleum refining
operations, which are likely to have a significant environmental impact. We also require that our
sample firms have the requisite data available from Compustat. Our final sample consists of 80
firms from the food industry and 30 firms from the oil and gas industry.
DISCLOSURES ANALYSED
Since we are interested in the firm’s decision to voluntary disclose CSR information, we take care
not to include mandatory information in our analysis. According to Hughes, Sander and Reier
(2000), the financial statements and the notes as well as the management’s discussion and analysis
(MD&A) can be regarded as mandatory disclosures. It was decided that only obvious disclosures of
a non-mandatory nature would be considered as over 70% of US firms make mandatory CSR
disclosures (Holland & Foo 2003).
As firms use various media to make CSR disclosures (Van Staden & Hooks 2007), we use
three measures of CSR disclosure. First, we search the websites for each firm in our sample to
identify disclosing firms which have issued CSR reports. These are taken to be firms which provide
access to their corporate CSR reports through their website as a stand-alone document for the 2006
year. Firms were considered as non-disclosing if there was no CSR report on their website. This
variable is labelled RPT and is coded as 1 for disclosing firms and 0 for non-disclosing firms. This
is regarded as discretionary as firms have the choice to make these disclosures or not.
Second, a broader definition of CSR disclosure is also considered. Companies may decide to
disclose CSR information as a separate section on their website as a substitute to issuing a report
due to cost savings and easier stakeholder access. Firms were considered as providing disclosure on
related to earnings quality) when political costs are low and negatively related to earnings management (i.e. positively
related to earnings quality) when political costs are high.
10
To support our contention that the food industry is less politically visible, we searched Factiva. Using the key words
‘oil and gas industry’ and ‘U.S. Congress’, we find 791 articles in 2006, the period of our study. In contrast, using the
key words ‘food industry’ and ‘U.S. Congress’, we find only 374 articles.
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their website if there was a separate webpage (or webpages) on CSR between August and
September 2007. This variable is labelled WEB and is coded as 1 for disclosing firms and 0 for nondisclosing firms.This is regarded as discretionary as firms have the choice to make these disclosures
or not.
Third, we also use a comprehensive measure that captures CSR disclosure in a separate
report, on the website, or in the annual report. We label this variable as ANY_DISC variable and
code it as 1 for firms disclosing CSR information through any of these avenues (i.e., stand-alone
reports on websites, separate sections on websites, disclosures in annual reports).
Discretionary Accruals
Consistent with the accounting literature, we estimate discretionary accruals using the crosssectional Jones (1991) model. The Jones model regresses total accruals of the change in sales and
plant, property, and equipment (PPE). The rationale is that the change in sales and PPE control for
the non-discretionary part of accruals since working capital (short-term) accruals fluctuate with
sales and depreciation expense fluctuates with PPE. We also control for ROA following Kothari et
al. (2005). We estimate the Jones model for each of our industries separately and use the absolute
value of the residual for each firm as an estimate of its discretionary accruals. More formally, we
estimate the following model:
TA = β0 + β1ΔSALES + β2PPE + β3ROA + ε
(1)
where:
TA = total accruals calculated as income before extraordinary items less cash flows from
operations plus discontinued operations deflated by total assets,
ΔSales = sales in year t minus sales in year t-1deflated by total assets,
PPE = plant, property and equipment deflated by total assets,
ROA = return on assets which is total operating income divided by total assets.
We use the absolute value, rather than signed value, of the residual as our measure of
discretionary accruals because the absolute value reflects the reversal of accruals over time. That is,
because accruals merely shift revenues or expenses from one period to another, an incomeincreasing accrual taken will lead to an income-decreasing accrual in another period. Thus, the size
of the accrual is more important than the direction of the accrual. We label the absolute value of the
residual as EM.
Model
We test our hypotheses by regressing earnings management on CSR disclosure (either RPT, WEB or
ANY_DISC) while controlling for other factors that may affect the level of earnings management.
We control for size to control for political costs related to size, since size is often used to
proxy for political costs (e.g. Watts & Zimmerman 1986). We control for size-related political cost
factors because we are interested in political costs associated with industries rather than the firms
themselves. We control for leverage since prior research indicates that managers increase earnings
to avoid violating debt covenants (e.g. Press & Weintrop 1990). Also, we control for firm
performance (return on assets) since Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) show that discretionary
accruals are correlated with performance, and we control for sales growth, measured by the
percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t, since growth firms have more incentives to meet
earnings targets (e.g. Skinner & Sloan 2002).
Thus, we estimate the following model to test H1A and H1B:
EM = β0 + β1CSR_DISC + β2LN_SIZE + β3LEV + β4ROA + β5GROWTH + ε
(2)
where:
CSR_DISC
= RPT, WEB, or ANY_DISC,
LN_SIZE =
natural log of total assets,
LEV = long-term debt divided by total assets,
ROA = return on assets which is total operating income divided by total assets,
GROWTH = change in sales from 2005 to 2006.
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Results
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analysis
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the food industry (panel A) and for the oil and gas
industry (panel B). For the control variables, the oil and gas firms are larger, have lower leverage,
higher profits, and higher growth than the food firms. Further, based on a t-test (untabulated), the
differences in size and leverage are significant; based on a Mann-Whitney test (also untabulated),
the differences in size, ROA, and growth are significant. These findings suggest that it is important
to control for these dimensions in our latter multivariate tests. Table 1 also provides the reporting
frequencies for CSR disclosures. For the food industry, 36.3% of firms provide some type of CSR
disclosures. The most common method of disclosure is through the website with 33.8% of firms
providing disclosure through this medium while 12.5% provide a stand-alone report. It is important
to note that RPT and WEB are not mutually exclusive since some firms provide both types of
disclosure.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Panel A. Food industry
Variables
EM
LN_SIZE
LEV
ROA
GROWTH

ANY_DISC
WEB
RPT

N
80
80
80
80
80

Mean
0.074
6.611
0.205
0.023
0.145

Median
0.026
6.343
0.180
0.045
0.081

Std Dev
0.145
2.687
0.177
0.411
0.539

N

No Rep
0
51
53
70

CSR Rep
1
29
27
10

CSR Rep
%
36.3%
33.8%
12.5%

Mean
0.032
9.246
0.150
0.076
0.313

Median
0.019
9.790
0.118
0.111
0.137

Std Dev
0.031
2.661
0.128
0.224
0.109

80
80
80

Q1
0.013
4.638
0.068
0.017
0.028

Q3
0.073
8.843
0.300
0.093
0.166

Q1
0.008
7.359
0.049
0.086
0.050

Q3
0.049
11.693
0.233
0.161
0.239

Panel B. Oil and gas industry
Variables
EM
LN_SIZE
LEV
ROA
GROWTH

N
30
30
30
30
30
N

No Rep
CSR Rep
CSR Rep
0
1
%
ANY_DISC
30
7
23
76.7%
WEB
30
7
23
76.7%
RPT
30
16
14
46.7%
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study. Panel A provides the descriptive statistics
for 80 firms in the food industry. Panel B provides the descriptive statistics for 30 firms in the oil industry. The
variables are defined as follows: EM = absolute value of discretionary accruals from the Jones (1991) model; LN_SIZE
= natural log of total assets; LEV = long-term debt divided by total assets; ROA = return on assets which is total
operating income divided by total assets; GROWTH = change in sales from 2005 to 2006; ANY_DISC = 1 if a firm
provided CSR disclosure in a stand-alone report on its website, or in a separate section on its website, or in its annual
report, 0 otherwise; WEB = 1 if a firm provided CSR disclosure through its website; RPT = 1 if a firm provided CSR
disclosure in a stand-alone report on its website.
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For the oil and gas industry, 76.7% of firms provide some type of CSR disclosure. The most
common form of disclosure is through the firm’s website with 76.7% using this method. In fact,
ANY_DISC and WEB are identical for the oil and gas firms, indicating that all firms that provided
some disclosure did so through their website. However, since firms can provide disclosure through
more than one method, this does not mean that no firms provided disclosure through separate
reports or through the annual report. 46.7% of the firms (or 60.9% of the firms where ANY_DISC is
equal to 1) provide a separate CSR report. While the descriptive evidence on disclosure frequency
suggests a higher frequency of disclosure for oil and gas firms in all categories, we provide formal
tests of H1A and H1B in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 2 provides the Spearman correlations for the disclosure measures and for the control
variables. Table 2, panel A shows that the three disclosure measures are highly correlated for the
food firms, ranging from 0.501 for the correlation between ANY_DISC and RPT to 0.947 for the
correlation between ANY_DISC and WEB. We also find ANY_DISC is highly correlated with
LN_SIZE (r = 0.657), suggesting that large firms are more likely to disclose CSR information.
There is also some evidence that high leverage firms are more likely to provide CSR disclosure.
Table 2, panel B shows for the oil and gas firms that, as discussed above, ANY_DISC and WEB are
perfectly correlated. RPT is also highly correlated with ANY_DISC and WEB (r = 0.516). As with
the food sample, we find that large firms and more levered firms are more likely to provide CSR
disclosure.
Before testing our hypotheses, we examine the relative reporting frequency between the
food and oil and gas industries. We use 2x2 contingency tables. Table 3, panel A provides the
results for ANY_DISC. The table shows both the actual and expected frequencies. For example, it is
expected that 42.2 firms would provide no CSR disclosure, but the actual frequency is 51 firms.
Therefore, 8.8 more food firms (or 11% of the food sample) than expected do not provide
disclosure. On the other hand, 8.8 more oil and gas firms (29.3% of the oil and gas sample) than
expected provided at least some CSR disclosure. The difference in actual and expected frequencies
is highly significant based on a chi-square test (p < 0.01) which provides support for the notion that
oil and gas firms are under more pressure to make these disclosures.
Table 3, panel B reports the results based on website disclosure. Again, the number of food
industry firms providing no disclosure is greater than expected while the number of oil and gas
firms providing some disclosure is greater than expected. The chi-square test is also significant for
panel B, providing further support for our expectations. Table 3, panel C gives a similar result for
reporting frequencies based on disclosure of separate reports. Overall, these results suggest that oil
and gas firms are more likely to provide voluntary CSR disclosures. However, these analyses do
not consider earnings management.
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Table 2
Spearman correlations
Panel A. Food industry (N=80)
ANY_DISC
WEB
RPT
LN_SIZE
LEV
ROA
GROWTH

ANY_DISC
1.000
0.947**
0.501**
0.657**
0.263*
0.056
0.056

WEB

RPT

1.000
0.530**
0.607
0.255*
0.274*
0.066

1.000
0.465**
0.118
0.267*
0.119

WEB

RPT

LN_SIZE

LEV

ROA

GROWTH

1.000
0.036**
0.442**
-0.031

1.000
-0.101
0.068

1.000
0.129

1.000

LN_SIZE

LEV

ROA

GROWTH

1.000
-0.273
0.279
-0.122

1.000
-0.558**
0.140

1.000
0.135

1.000

Panel B. Oil and gas industry (N=30)
ANY_DISC
WEB
RPT
LN_SIZE
LEV
ROA
GROWTH

ANY_DISC
1.000
1.000**
0.516**
0.660**
0.105*
0.023
-0.132

1.000
0.516**
0.660**
0.105*
0.023
-0.132

1.000
0.749**
-0.124
0.023
0.069

This table provides Spearman correlations for the independent variables used to estimate equation (2). Panel A provides the correlations for 80 firms in the
food industry. Panel B provides the correlations for 30 firms in the oil industry. The variables have been defined in Table 1.
* and ** indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
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Table 3
Likelihood of environmental reporting (expected frequencies in parentheses)
Panel A. Any disclosure
No disclosure
(ANY_DISC = 0)
51
(42.2)
7
(15.8)

Food industry
Oil and gas industry

Disclosure
(ANY_DISC =1)
29
(37.8)
23
(14.2)

χ2 = 14.299, p < 0.01

Panel B. Web disclosure
No disclosure
(WEB = 0)
Food industry
53
(43.6)
Oil and gas industry
7
(16.4)
χ2 = 16.208, p < 0.01

Disclosure
(WEB =1)
27
(36.4)
23
(16.6)

Panel C. Report disclosure
Food industry
Oil and gas industry

No disclosure
(RPT = 0)
70
(62.5)
16
(23.5)
χ2 = 14.931, p < 0.01

Disclosure
(RPT =1)
10
(17.5)
14
(6.5)

This table provides the results of χ2-tests based on disclosure and industry membership. The sample consists
of 80 firms from the food industry and 30 firms from the oil industry. Disclosure variables are defined as
follows: ANY_DISC = 1 if a firm provided CSR disclosure in a stand-alone report on its website, or in a
separate section on its website, or in its annual report, 0 otherwise; WEB = 1 if a firm provided CSR
disclosure through its website; RPT = 1 if a firm provided CSR disclosure in a stand-alone report on its
website.

Multivariate Analysis
We now turn our attention to H1A and H1B which examine whether CSR disclosures are positively
related or negatively related to earnings management in the food and oil and gas industries. Table 4
provides the estimation results for the regression of EM on CSR disclosure and the control variables
using the food industry sample. As before, we use three different measures for CSR disclosure.
Table 4, column (1) contains the results where ANY_DISC is used to capture CSR
disclosure. ANY_DISC is positive and significant, indicating that firms with poor earnings quality
are making CSR disclosures. Table 4, columns 2 and 3 provide the results for WEB and RPT,
respectively. In each of the models, the CSR disclosure measure is positive and significant,
indicating greater earnings management (and poorer earnings quality) for disclosing firms. This
finding is contrary to the ethical perspective which predicts a negative relationship between CSR
disclosure and earnings management.
For the control variables, we find that firm size is negatively related to earnings
management, suggesting that large firms manage earnings less. Also, we find a significant and
negative relationship between EM and ROA, indicating earnings management is a decreasing
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function of profitability. These results are consistent across the three models. Further, all three
models have good explanatory power with adjusted R2’s ranging from 48.5% to 48.8%.
Table 4
Results for food industry
Variables

Predicted
Sign
H1A H1B

Intercept
ANY_DISC

-

+

WEB

-

+

REPT

-

+

LN_SIZE
LEV
ROA
GROWTH

N
F-statistic
Adjusted R2

(1)
0.219
5.767***
0.049
1.456*

(2)
0.214
5.741***

(3)
0.214
5.847***

0.042
1.311*

-0.025
-3.887***
0.027
0.358
-0.178
-5.607***
-0.016
-0.768

-0.024
-3.872***
0.026
0.341
-0.179
-5.641***
-0.017
-0.801

0.062
1.502*
-0.023
-4.104***
0.033
0.435
-0.178
-5.632***
-0.019
-0.886

80
16.030***

80
15.868***

80
16.085***

0.488

0.485

0.488

This table shows the results for equation (2) where the dependent variable is EM which is the absolute
value of discretionary accruals from the Jones (1991) model. Equation (2) is estimated using 80 firms from
the food industry. The independent variables have been defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Tests are one-tailed where a sign is predicted.

Table 5 presents the results for the oil and gas industry. We find a strong negative
relationship between EM and ANY_DISC. While a negative relationship could be consistent with an
ethical response, in conjunction with the results from the food industry, the results are consistent
with H1B, i.e., political costs appear to be driving the relationship between CSR disclosure and
earnings management.
Recall that ANY_DISC and WEB are identical since all oil and gas firms that provided some
disclosure did so through their websites. Thus, the results for Web are identical to the results for
ANY_DISC. For RPT, we find no relationship between CSR disclosure and earnings management.
This is not surprising since the website disclosure dominates all other forms of reporting. That is,
perhaps because of reach and visibility, oil and gas firms that want to provide CSR disclosures will
do so through the web. Thus, the separate CSR report is not seen as a primary mechanism for
disseminating this information to the outside for oil and gas firms. For the models in Table 5, the
adjusted R2’s range from 53.5% to 63.3% indicating that the models have good explanatory power.
In contrast to the food industry, we find some evidence LEV and GROWTH are important control
variables, although LNSIZE is significant in model (3).
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Table 5
Results for oil and gas industry
Variables

Predicted
Sign
H1A H1B

Intercept
ANY_DISC

-

-

WEB

-

-

REPT

-

-

LN_SIZE
LEV
ROA
GROWTH

N
F-statistic
Adjusted R2

(1)
0.041
2.316**
-0.032
-2.766***

(2)
0.041
2.316*

(3)
0.068
3.059***

-0.032
-2.766***

0.000
-0.143
0.075
1.893**
0.017
0.947
0.011
3.426***

0.000
-0.143
0.075
1.893**
0.017
0.947
0.011
3.426***

0.011
0.983
-0.006
-2.320**
0.038
0.903
0.024
1.168
0.012
3.423***

30
11.013***

30
11.013***

30
7.674***

0.633

0.633

0.535

This table shows the results for equation (2) where the dependent variable is EM which is the absolute
value of discretionary accruals from the Jones (1991) model. Equation (2) is estimated using 30 firms
from the oil industry. The independent variables have been defined in Table 1. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Tests are one-tailed where a sign
is predicted.

Overall, taking into account the results for the food industry (Table 4) in conjunction with
the oil and gas industry (Table 5), our results shows no support for hypothesis 1A (which suggests a
negative relationship between earnings management and CSR disclosure for both industries) and
support for hypothesis 1B (which suggests different relationships between earnings management
and CSR disclosure depending on political costs). We therefore find support for the political cost
perspective. Thus, while firms may be involved in ethical activities (as discussed in the CSR
reports), ethical considerations do not appear to influence CSR reporting decisions.11 Instead, firms
choose to do CSR reporting in order to minimise their political exposure.
Sensitivity test
One concern about the previous analysis is that our results might be affected by differences in the
variability of pre-managed earnings between the food and oil and gas firms. In other words, if premanaged earnings are more volatile, discretionary accruals might be a less precise measure of
earnings management. The variability of pre-managed earnings could exhibit an industry
component since oil and gas producing firms operate in highly volatile regions of the world. On the
11

We argue that if ethical considerations were the dominant influence, we would expect to find a significant negative
relationship between earnings management and CSR disclosure regardless of political costs. Since we find different
relationships (i.e. positive and negative) in different industries facing different political costs, we posit that this shows
that political costs are driving the relationship.
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other hand, the food industry is more stable with raw material inputs coming mainly from domestic
sources or from more stable regions of the world. If earnings variability is related to industry
membership, earnings variability rather than political costs may be driving the results.
To address this concern, we estimate equation (2) separately for firms with high and low
variability in sales. We use variability in sales as a measure of pre-managed earnings volatility
instead of variability in earnings, since the latter could be affected by earnings management. Thus,
the change in sales is a better proxy for the change in pre-managed earnings. Table 6 provides the
results for this analysis using ANY_DISC as the measure of CSR disclosure. In both models,
ANY_DISC is insignificant. This indicates that the results from our previous analysis (in Tables 4
& 5) are not due to pre-managed earnings variability but rather reflect an industry (political cost)
effect.
Table 6
Results for high and low sales volatility
Variables
Intercept

High Sales Volatility

Low Sales Volatility

0.221
4.229***
0.046
0.985
-0.024
-2.924***
0.066
0.473
-0.209
-3.414***
-0.011
-0.674

0.116
3.692***
0.000
0.005
-0.008
-1.710**
-0.030
-0.591
-0.148
-6.557***
0.114
0.514

N
F-statistic

55
8.112***

55
15.650***

Adjusted R2

0.397

ANY_DISC
LN_SIZE
LEV
ROA
GROWTH

0.576

This table shows the results for equation (2) where the sample is partitioned based on sales volatility
and the dependent variable is EM. The independent variables have been defined in Table 1. *, **, and
*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

Conclusion
Francis et al. (2008) find a significant complementary relationship where firms with better earnings
quality (i.e., less earnings management) have provided more voluntary disclosures. We extend
Francis et al. (2008) to CSR disclosures in order to investigate whether the relationship between
earnings management and CSR disclosure decisions are affected by ethical considerations. If they
are, we expect a negative relationship between CSR disclosure and earnings management.
However, a competing explanation is that the relationship between earnings management and CSR
disclosure decisions are driven by other factors, including political costs. Thus, we examine the
relationship between CSR disclosures and earnings management in two US industries, one with
high political visibility and one with low political visibility. We use the oil and gas industry because
it has regularly been scrutinised and targeted by politicians. We use the food industry since it has
attracted much less political attention relative to the oil and gas industry.
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Using discretionary accruals to measure earnings management, we find that CSR and
earnings management are negatively related in the oil and gas industry, but positively related in the
food industry. These findings suggest a complementary relationship between earnings quality and
CSR disclosure in the oil and gas industry, and a substitutive relationship between earnings quality
and CSR disclosure in the food industry. The different results for the two industries are important
because they support the view that political considerations have a greater influence on the
relationship between earnings management and CSR disclosure decisions than ethical
considerations. Thus, our results add to understanding the contextual nature of earnings
management and CSR disclosure.
While CSR is therefore becoming increasingly important in the current business
environment, CSR reporting decisions appear to be driven by more traditional concerns such as
avoiding political scrutiny and the costs that may arise from that scrutiny. As an avenue for future
research, researchers could extend our analysis to examine whether other agency/contracting based
costs – such as those related to compensation and debt contracts – also dominate ethical
considerations in financial reporting decisions.
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